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OF "LIBERTY" AND "PROPERTY"*
Henry Paul Monaghant
After a century of experience, we are now thoroughly accus-
tomed to viewing the fourteenth amendment as imposing upon the
experimentation otherwise permitted in our fifty separate
"laboratories" limitations that do not materially differ from those
fastened upon the national government by the bill of rights.' The
history of this evolution is far too well known to justify rehearsing
here even in the barest outline.2 But it bears noting that few, if any,
observers believe that the language of the amendment has played a
significant role in this historical evolution. Here, as elsewhere,
"[b]ehind the words . .. are postulates which limit and control. 3
The governing postulates, to be sure, have shifted over time,
ranging from conceptions of vested rights and laissez-faire
economics to more recent concerns for representative democracy,
equality, and individual dignity. But postulates, not textual
analysis, have been the impelling force behind the various theories
used to justify application of most of the specific guarantees of the
bill of rights to the states as part of the "liberty" secured by the
due process clause. 4 Similarly, postulates, not language, have been
at the root of the apparently unending controversy over the extent
to which the Supreme Court may properly invoke the amendment
to constitutionalize values not readily inferable from the constitu-
tional text, structure, or history.5
Whatever the governing set of ideological postulates, they have
rendered largely unimportant, except as a forensic matter, any
* This Article was prepared in connection with a lecture delivered by the author on
October 27, 1976, for the Frank Irvine Lecture Series at the Cornell Law School.
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1955, University of Massa-
chusetts; LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard University.
I Compare this view with the initial view of the amendment announced in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
2 The standard treatment remains E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948).
3 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
'See, e.g., Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 64-69
(1976). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506-47
(9th ed. 1975). Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 96 S. Ct. 2781 (1976), potentially the most recent
round in the continuing controversy, carefully skirts the basic issues. Id. at 2787.
5 Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1975).
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distinction between equal protection and substantive due process.6
To be sure, the greater appeal of equal protection in terms of
current constitutional and political theory is apparent. But for all
practical purposes, the equal protection clause forbids few dis-
criminations that are not similarly forbidden by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 7 That fact will become increasingly
clear as the noxious odor long surrounding the concept of substan-
tive due process steadily dissipates.' In reality, then, the history of
the fourteenth amendment has always been the history of the due
process clause-so far, that is, as it can be viewed as the history of
any textual provision.
For decades the crucial fourteenth amendment battles have
been fought over the substantive validity of action taken by the
states. This has occasioned considerable controversy both within
and without the Court over whether some individual interests
might weigh more heavily than others for constitutional purposes.9
But these well-publicized disputes have concealed at least one im-
portant area of agreement. Save for Mr. Justice Harlan's singular
insistence that voting in state elections is an interest not encom-
passed by the first section of the fourteenth amendment," there
seems to have been an overriding consensus that every individual
"interest" worth talking about is encompassed within the "liberty"
6 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 56 (1958). But see Linde,Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 233-35 (1972) (arguing that, for advocates of judicial "realism,"
"beneficial" results might follow from treating the two clauses as not identical). See also A.
Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 70 (1976).7 E.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103-04 (1976); Examining Bd. v.
Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976); Mathews v. De Castro, 97 S. Ct. 431, 432
n.1 (1976). Mr. Justice Jackson's widely admired concurrence in Railway Express v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1949), asserting that due process permanently disables a state
from enacting legislation while equal protection requires only that the legislation be gen-
eralized is plainly wrong. Due process is often concerned only with the discrimination
created by federal statutes. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, supra. See also United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). Equal protection analysis is concerned
with assessing the validity of certain governmental ends. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). The equal protection clause is also quite capable of raising essentially
procedural due process issues. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is the most dramatic illustration of the reemergence
of substantive due process. Substantive due process has always had academic admirers who
spend considerable time and inventiveness in efforts to justify and limit the concept. See
generally Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Perry,
Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976); Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions For The Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 261. But see Dixon, supra note 4.
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2569-90 (1976)
(dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
10 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152-219 (1970) (dissenting in part, Harlan, J.).
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and "property" secured by the due process clause and thus entitled
to some constitutional protection, if only that of the "baseline re-
quirement of 'rationality.' ""1 The "right-privilege" distinction, the
last barrier to such a consensus, has completely fallen. 12 That doc-
trine had been invoked to justify a denial of due process scrutiny of
some types of governmental conduct in the public sector; for ex-
ample, since there was no independent "right" to welfare pay-
ments, their denial, standing alone, did not implicate any constitu-
tional value. So ran the argument, at least. But the logic of this
argument was flawed. Whether they constituted "rights" or not
in some technical sense, the "entitlement" interests created by
statutory law could still amount to "liberty" or "property" in the
constitutional sense.' 3 The "right-privilege" doctrine's lack of solid
theoretical underpinning resulted in its erratic enforcement and,
ultimately, its demise.' 4
Most importantly, the criterion for determining whether an
interest deserved due process clause protection involved a simple
pragmatic assessment of its "importance" to the individual. Bell v.
Burson,'5 decided in 1971, represented the high-water mark of this
approach. In sustaining a procedural due process objection to a
state automobile license suspension statute, the Court hurried over
the threshold question of whether the clause was applicable at all.
The Court simply observed that a license "may become essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood,"' 6 and then said that its suspension
"thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of
the licensees.' ' 7
Bell wholly eschewed a tight, textually-oriented examination of
the interests secured by the due process clause. The Court could
have said that the license was sufficient to qualify as "property," or
that a suspension of an individual's freedom to drive was a restric-
tion on his "liberty." The Court said neither; the importance of the
" Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928 (1973).
" See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2684 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972).
13 As Justice Holmes once trenchantly noted: "Such words as 'right' are a constant
solicitation to fallacy." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
14 For an analysis of the erratic reach of the doctrine-which was applied even to bar
claims made with respect to specific constitutional rights such as freedom of speech-
before its total collapse, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Priilege Distinction In Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See also Van Alstyne, Cracks in the Neu, Property,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
15 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
16 Id. at 539.
17 Id. There were no dissents, but three justices silently concurred only in the result. Id.
at 543.
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interest alone sufficed, and "importance" was determined as a mat-
ter of federal, not state, law. Whatever else may be said of Bell, it
fitted comfortably with current standing doctrine in its recognition
that "injury in fact" normally constituted a constitutionally suffi-
cient predicate for the invocation of federal judicial power.1 8 And
it is fair to say that when Bell was decided there were few lawyers,
on or off the bench, who had serious problems with its pragmatic
approach to deciding what individual interests implicated the due
process clause.
But in fact Bell's latitudinarian approach to "liberty" and
"property" was soon eroded. New postulates that limit and control
pressed for recognition, and they now find at least partial expres-
sion in a more restrictive conception of what constitutes constitu-
tional "liberty" and "property." Those postulates are clear enough.
Rightly or wrongly, a majority of the present Court is struggling to
place limits on the level of federal superintendence of the opera-
tions of state and local government, a struggle which has occurred
largely in the context of "section 1983" actions. 9 That statute
creates a federal right of action for state conduct which deprives a
person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.1121 Under its aegis, aggressive and inventive lawyers
have brought a staggering range of complaints to the courts. From
their perspective, they are simply attempting to "constitutionalize"
the realm of state and local government. But, quite plainly, a ma-
jority of the Court rejects this approach and seems determined to
prevent the escalation of every grievance against state and local
government into a constitutional claim.21
Read literally, section 1983 incorporates every "liberty" or
"property" interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Ac-
cordingly, statutory explication necessarily becomes constitutional
exegesis as well. With increasing frequency, the Court has con-
cluded that neither "liberty" nor "property" has been threatened
by state action and hence no section 1983 claim has been stated.
Morrissey v. Brewer,22 a due process challenge to parole revocation
procedures decided in the term following Bell, laid the ground-
work. In passing upon the constitutional challenge, the Court did
mention the importance of the individual interest, but it stressed
18 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-39 (1976).
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2" Id. (emphasis added).
2 E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2540 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
349-50 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
22 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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that "[t]he question is not merely the 'weight' of the individual's
interest, but whether the nature of the interest is one within.., the
'liberty or property' language"23 of the due process clause. This
language was repeated later in the term in Board of Regents v.
Roth,2 4 where, for the first time, a divided Court rejected a pro-
cedural due process claim because it implicated neither "liberty"
nor "property." The "range of interests protected by procedural
due process,"2 5 said the Court, is "broad indeed, ' 26 but "not
infinite. '27
The analytical shift worked by Roth is significant. Prior to Roth,
Supreme Court definitions of "liberty" and "property" had
amounted to taking the words "life, liberty or property" as a uni-
tary concept embracing all interests valued by sensible men. After
Roth, however, each word of the clause must be examined sepa-
rately; so examined, we find that they do not embrace the full
range of state conduct having serious impact upon individual in-
terests. For Roth's emphasis on the need for careful analysis of the
"nature of the interest at stake"28 has not proved to be an isolated
phenomenon. Indeed, in the last term, this concern reached almost
epidemic proportions. Several decisions expressed doubt as to
whether the challenged state conduct interfered with "liberty" or
"property, ' 29 and the lack of a protectible interest proved decisive
in three important cases. In Paul v. Davis,30 a sharply divided Court
held that state defamation of a private individual "standing alone
and apart from any other governmental action"31 did not implicate
any "liberty" protected by the due process clause. The five-man
majority argued that "reputation alone, apart from some more
tangible interests" lay outside the range of liberties protected by
23Id. at 481.
24 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1971). In Roth "[w]e ... held that the determining factor is the
nature of the interest involved rather than its weight." Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532,
2538 (1976).
25 408 U.S. at 570.
26 Id. at 572.
27 Id. at 570. The Court specifically rejected the view that the collateral consequences, in
terms of reduced job mobility, of the decision not to rehire were enough to implicate due
process. Id. at 574 n. 13.281 Id. at 571 (emphasis in original).
29 In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976), for example, the Court was only
willing to assume arguendo that liberty was implicated by hair-length regulation as a condi-
tion of police employment. See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668,
680-81 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.); Tennessee v. Dunlap, 426 U.S. 312, 316 n.3
(1976).
30 424 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
31 424 U.S. at 694.
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the fourteenth amendment. 32 This decision would have created no
great surprise in 1876; one hundred years later, however, it can be
expected to generate considerable negative response. 33 Paul was
followed by Meachum v. Fano,3 4 where, in a six to three decision,
the Court held that a state prisoner attacking the procedures sur-
rounding his transfer from a less restrictive to a more restrictive
prison asserted no "liberty" interest.35 Sandwiched between those
cases came the five to four decision in Bishop v. Wood,3 6 which
denied that any "property" interest was implicated in the termina-
tion of the employment of a nonprobationary public employee.
The analytical framework of these decisions represents an im-
portant and acknowledged break with traditions developed over
the last half century which appeared to be firmly embedded in our
constitutional order. These decisions, therefore, demand a new
assessment of the nature of the interests secured by the due pro-
cess clause. We must disinter long buried history, and examine
anew the criteria for giving meaning to the "blind concepts" of
"liberty" and "property. 37
32 Id. at 701.
" See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminay View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293,
322-38 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 86-104 (1976).
34 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).3 51 Id. at 2538.
36 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The Court also rejected a "liberty" claim on the authority of
Roth. Id. at 348.
37 Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections On The Supreme Court's Balancing Test,
76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963).
In focusing upon "liberty" and "property," I do not minimize the future importance of
giving some content to the word "life." But that is a subject requiring separate treatment. I
offer a few preliminary comments here. We are at the beginning of an attempt to form a
new public consensus-or rather, a new public philosophy-on the meaning of life and
death, a problem forced upon us by developments in modern technology. See Steele &
Hill, A Legislative Proposal for a Legal Right to Die, 12 CRI5. L. BULL. 140 (1976). This
development necessarily implicates the guarantee of "life" contained in the due process
clause.
The common-law definition of "life" was entirely in accord with the existing medical
technology: life ended with failure of heart and breath. The adequacy of this definition
raised some questions, particularly in the context of euthanasia. But the necessity for a
coherent definition of life has, in our time, become vastly more acute because modern
science has invented "life"-prolonging medical devices. A body can be kept "alive"-heart
beating, breathing secure-long after cognitive functions have been wholly and irreversibly
destroyed, Several states have responded to this phenomenon by redefining death in terms
of brain activity. Does the use of the new criterion to justify withdrawal of life-supporting
devices deprive a person of "life" within the meaning of the due process clause? It is
difficult for me to believe that state law definitions of life should have any role in giving
content to that word for purposes of the due process clause. The mind, to say nothing of
the spirit, boggles at the notion that a person may, for constitutional purposes, be "alive" in
one state but "dead" when moved across a state line. If life-sustaining support can validly
be withdrawn from a patient, it is not because that person is not "alive" within the meaning
1977] OF "LIBERTY" AND "PROPERTY"
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LIBERTY
A. Historical Origins
The importance of the due process clause as a restriction on
state conduct has rested in large measure upon a spacious concep-
tion of the word "liberty." Prior to the Civil War, as Judge Hough
noted in his 1918 Irvine Lecture on this subject, there was little
evidence that due process "liberty" meant anything more than
freedom from personal restraint 8 This was certainly the com-
mon-law understanding of the term. For Blackstone, "liberty"--
"the power of locomotion ... without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law"39-was only one of the three "abso-
of the fourteenth amendment but because, in the circumstances, the withdrawal is not a
deprivation of due process. And this is not the only, indeed, perhaps not even the most
important, context in which the issue arises. For some of these devices, such as kidney
machines, are scarce resources, and the demand may exceed the supply. To what extent,
and under what criteria, are such machines to be used on persons in the condition of
Karen Ann Quinlan? See Note, Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce Lifesaving Medical
Resources, 84 YALE L.J. 1734 (1975).
We may yet come to recognize that a grey area exists, where some persons, while not
totally dead, are not fully alive either, and that their interests may, in some circumstances,
be subordinated to the interests of those whose consciousness is not irreversibly destroyed.
This is a frightening thought, one with profound moral and legal implications. But it is a
thought, I fear, which we will be unable to avoid as the "new biology" develops ever more
elaborate life-sustaining devices. The Court will, in any event, be forced to provide some
content for the word "life," something it (unsuccessfully) sought to avoid in the abortion
cases. Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 167-81.
My own view is that whatever the ultimate substantive and procedural resolutions, "life" in
the due process clause encompasses the common-law definition. That is clearly the histori-
cal understanding, since there could be no other. But I recognize that the Court has for-
saken history in other situations where it seemed controlling.
38 Hough, Due Process of Law--To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 222-23 (1918). Generally,
this concern with freedom from personal restraint did not include an assessment of the
validity of the substantive reasons for the restraint, only the adequacy of the procedure.
For an excellent discussion, see Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "'Liberty" in Those
Clauses In The Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4
HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891). This is not to overlook the fact that, at least until 1830, many
judges appealed to extra-constitutional theories such as natural law to question the substan-
tive validity of governmental action. Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
DalI.) 386 (1798), is the most famous example. See also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
43 (1815); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Although there is some dis-
agreement (see Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and
Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419-20 (1973)), this mode of thinking does not seem to have
been tied to the due process clause, but to general reasoning about the nature of society
and government. In any event, from about 1830-1860, this mode of reasoning fell into
discard. See E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 58-115.
39 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND: OF THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS *134.
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lute rights of every Englishman."4"' The others were the right of
property and the right of personal security, 4 ' the latter term, inci-
dentally, including "reputation. ' 42 The Blackstonian conception
of liberty is both purely negative--i.e., freedom from governmental
interference-and limited. It is not the equivalent of an all encom-
passing "right to be let alone"; 43 it is a right to be let alone only with
respect to one's bodily movement. 44 It is the kind of interest,
roughly speaking, that common-law courts protected in habeas
corpus and false imprisonment actions.
Following the Civil War, the bar, always, as de Tocqueville
said, "eminently conservative and anti-democratic, ' 45 and en-
chanted with notions of natural law and Herbert Spenser's Social
Darwinian restrictions on state legislation, sought some textual ve-
hicle for imposing limits upon the rapidly increasing state legisla-
tion that, in its view, interfered with the "right of property." The
bar increasingly seized upon the due process clause, a text appear-
ing in both the federal and state constitutions, and urged that it
"might be construed so as to include within [its] scope all civil rights
pertaining to the individual. '46 "Liberty," in particular, "seemed an
especially convenient vehicle into which to pack all kinds of
rights. 47
The bar triumphed, first in the state courts, then in dissenting
opinions in the Supreme Court, and finally in the full Court.48
Allgeyer v. Louisiana49 explicitly repudiated the proposition that
"liberty" embraced "only the right of the citizen to be free from the
4 01d. at *128.4 1 1d. at * 129.4 21Id. at * 134. The common law did not conceive of "reputation" as a property interest.
4' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion, Brandeis,j.).
14 "Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the
personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may
direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 39, at * 134.
45 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (Bradley ed. 1953). For an argu-
ment that the bar is not much better today, see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
46 Warren, The New "Liberty" Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431,
439 (1926). Invocation of the general language of the due process clause simply gave tex-
tual articulation to a practice that, at one time, was more frankly extraconstitutional.4 1 Id. See also note 38 and accompanying text supra.
48 On the influential role of the bar, see B. TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION
18-173 (1942).
49 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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mere physical restraint of his person." '' The Court began in ear-
nest the famous "gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion,"''5 but it was an entirely one-way process. Decision after
decision sustained a broad, inclusive conception of the word
"liberty. '52 In 1916, in Butler v. Perry,5 3 Mr. Justice McReynolds
said that fourteenth amendment "liberty". "was intended to pre-
serve and protect fundamental rights long recognized under the
common law system. '54 Meyer v. Nebraska,5 5 decided in 1923, sum-
marized the development. Once again speaking through Justice
McReynolds, the Court stated that "liberty"
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. 56
This definition assumes that the due process clause itself creates
rights; freedom of contract, for example, becomes a right of con-
stitutional, rather than state law, origin. And although this ap-
proach does not, as a matter of logic, exclude the possibility of still
additional liberties being created by state law, the broad sweep of
the liberties created by the due process clause itself left that possi-
bility a dormant one.57
Accordingly, for nearly a half century, controversy has focused
upon the adequacy of the justification offered by the state for in-
terference with admitted constitutionally created liberties, and not
on the threshold issue of whether any "liberties" were threatened
by the state action. For example, none of Roe v. Wade's58 vigorous
critics had any doubt that a woman's freedom to choose an abor-
tion at least implicates a constitutional liberty. "Of course" it does,
writes Professor Ely, as does "anyone's freedom to do what he
511 Id. at 589.
51 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S.'97, 104 (1878).
52 The history is well told in Warren, supra note 46, at 454-64.
53 240 U.S. 328 (1916).5 4 Id. at 333.
55 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' 
6 d. at 399 (emphasis added).
57 As we shall see, the expanded definition of "liberty" swallowed up "property" and
made inevitable the application of the specifics of most of the bill of rights to the states.
See text accompanying notes 187-201 infra.
58 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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wants."5 9 So viewed, the "liberty" of the due process clause had
been transformed over time from a specific freedom from inter-
ference with locomotion to a general right of private autonomy. In
that process the language and theory of the opinions seemed to ab-
sorb at the very least all the Blackstonian rights of personal secu-
rity, including reputation. 6 ' Those rights, protected by the common
law from private interference, were transformed into liberties pro-
tected from governmental interference-unless the government
adequately justified its actions, a question going to the merits and
not to a threshold inquiry into the applicability of the due process
clause. 61 In so summarizing the cases I do not wish to fall into
what, for these purposes, is an irrelevant semantic argument over
whether this "liberty" is a wholly negative conception-a right to be
let alone. 62 But I think that such a conception is generally accurate.
For, in the main at least, this conception did not embrace affirma-
tive claims for governmental money, property, or employment. 63
B. A Note on Language
The ascription of a content to "liberty" beyond that of simple
freedom from physical restraint was a necessary predicate for the
concept of due process as a restraint upon the substance of legisla-
tion. That result is, I recognize, far too thoroughly embedded in
our constitutional jurisprudence to be now called into question.
But for me, giving a substantive content to "liberty" raises most
acutely the question of whether the language of the Constitution
has much to do with constitutional law. One has the impression
that many political scientists and some lawyers do not think so.
Leonard Levy puts this thesis sharply: "Justices who look to the
" Ely, supra note 11, at 935. For a philosophical discussion of the idea, and references
to sources, see J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 32 (1971). Undoubtedly because of
myopic vision, I do not see that discussion at the level of philosophy is of much relevance
here.
66 The decisions in this regard had absorbed the protection granted citizens by the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, which provided that "no mans honour or good
name shall be stayned" by government. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 148 (R. Perry ed.
1959).
61 See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1366 n.18 (1973).
62 See I. BERuN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY Xxxvii-lxii, 122-72 (1969). See also L. HAND,
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 144-54 (3d ed. 1960).
6 One must be careful not to overplay a negative-positive distinction. For example,
restrictions on government employment are now assumed at least to implicate some "lib-
erty" interest even though, on the state level, they were generally analyzed in equal protec-
tion terms. Compare Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 99 (1916), with
cases cited in note 7 supra.
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Constitution for more than a puzzling, if majestic, phrase might
just as well turn to the comic strips for all the guidance they will
find on how to decide most of the great cases that involve national
public policy . *."..64 But most lawyers are far from comfortable
with this conception, since, in the end, it denies any distinction be-
tween law and politics. 65 The absence of such a distinction, in turn,
raises grave questions as to the legitimacy of judicial review in a
democracy.66
Any serious effort to mark some boundary between law and
politics must take into account the constitutional text. A textual
exegesis at least confines judgment-the judicial construction must
be capable of being related to the text and to the structure it
creates.67 This, of course, still leaves a wide margin for judicial
activity. At the minimum it permits application of the Constitution
to new situations involving "the sorts of evils the framers meant to
combat and ... their twentieth century counterparts. 6 8 But even
this premise does not justify giving a substantive content to "liberty,"
for the evils that the clause was designed to prevent involved inter-
ferences with the freedom from personal restraint. Nor does the
so-called "two-clause" theory provide a satisfactory justification.
Professor Corwin formulates that theory in these terms:
[1]t will be generally found that words which refer to governing
institutions, like 'Jury," "legislature," "election," have been given
their strictly historical meaning, while words defining the
subject-matter of power or of rights like "commerce," "liberty,"
"property," have been deliberately moulded to the views of con-
temporary society. 69
This "two-clause" theory has won significant judicial and academic
acceptance as an accurate representation of the Framers' intent. T1
64 L. LEVY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1966).
65 Wechsler, The Courts And The Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1009-10 (1965).
66 See Monaghan, supra note 61, at 1363 n.3. See also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976).67 See generally Ely, supra note 11, at 928-37. On the relationship between text and
structure, see Monaghan, supra note 5, at 13 n.72 (commenting on C. BLACK, STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)).
66 Ely, supra note 11, at 929. See Gaffney, History and Legal Interpretation: The Early
Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 207, 215-16
(1976).
9 Corwin,Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 659-60 (1926), quoted in P.
BREST, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 117 (1975).
7
"See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 125 n.11 (1970) (dissenting opinion, Har-
lan, J.); P. BREST, supra note 69, at 117-18. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571-72 (1972).
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But in the area of substantive due process, it ignores the crucial
fact that the broad definition of "liberty" (and therefore of due
process) is wholly a judicial creation. Charles Curtis writes:
Take the phrase "due process of law." It is perhaps the prime
example of a large generality in our Constitution which has
gathered meaning from experience. But who made it a large
generality? Not they. We did. When they put it into the Fifth
Amendment, its meaning was as fixed and definite as the com-
mon law could make a phrase .... We turned the legal phrase
into common speech and raised its meaning into the similitude of
justice itself.71
If one agrees with Professor Corwin, that the "debates in Con-
gress on the [fourteenth] amendment leave one in little doubt of
the intention of its framers to nationalize civil liberty in the United
States 172 through the privileges and immunities clause, then ascrib-
ing a substantive content to due process is perhaps a defensible way
of correcting the original sin of the Slaughter-House Cases.73 But if
one finds the opposite conclusion far more probable,' 4 then ex-
panding "liberty" beyond freedom from personal restraint poses
one of the most unsettling problems in constitutional theory. How
can this extension be justified as a legitimate mode of constitutional
interpretation?75 I do not know. But, like others,7 6 I must accept
reality: this judicial expansion of "liberty" is now far too central a
part of our constitutional order to admit of reassessment. Indeed,
loosened from the fetters of original intent and fortified by judicial
precedent, I readily accept Roth's proposition that "[i]n a Constitu-
tion for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
'liberty' must be broad indeed. 77
C. Substantive Due Process As Equal Protection
Substantive due process fell on hard times in the New Deal days,
but not because of any general dissatisfaction with an expansive
concept of "liberty." The objections were, rather, that the courts
" Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 177 (E. Cahn
ed. 1954).
72 E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 118.
7' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
" See, e.g., Bickel, Citizenship In The American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 369, 373-80
(1973).
7' See C. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 567.
76 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion, Bran-
deis, J.); P. BREST, supra note 69, at 169-70.
7 408 U.S. at 572.
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continually rejected completely rational state justifications for legis-
lation that interfered with an admitted liberty to engage in free
enterprise.78 The Warren Court's invocation of the equal protec-
tion clause as the dominant textual vehicle for expressing its con-
stitutional doctrines was, of course, partly influenced by the stench
then surrounding the whole concept of substantive due process.7 9
But there was more to it than that. The equal protection clause
possessed a unique appeal because egalitarian notions underlay
so much of the Warren Court's thinking about the nature of both
the substantive and procedural restraints imposed by the Consti-
tution.8 s
Once freed from its historical moorings in race discrimina-
tion,"' the language of the equal protection clause apparently obvi-
ates any threshold need for inquiry into the nature of the interests
it protects. Equal protection analysis traditionally, and still domi-
nantly, focuses on the adequacy of the justification offered for state
classifications affecting (principally) state-created interests.82 The
common understanding is that the acceptability of the means-end
connection is ascertained by federal standards alone.
8 3
78 For representative comments see the articles collected in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOoLS, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693-732 (1938). See also
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962
Sup. CT. REV. 34. It is useful to compare these articles with the earlier attacks on viewing
"liberty" as dealing with anything beyond freedom from personal restraint. See, e.g., Shat-
tuck, supra note 38; Warren, supra note 46, at 439-40.
79 But the Warren Court invoked due process when that was the only avenue to reach
the desired result. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8 0 A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 5-8 (1968). See also P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 98-169 (1970). The language of the moribund
privileges and immunities clause could have provided the doctrinal foundation for the
developments associated with due process and equal protection. But the clause long ago
became an "idle provision." Compare McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth
Amendment, 4 IowA L. BuL. 219, 220-21 (1918), with Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U:L.Q. 405.
81 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The Court noted: "We doubt
very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview
of this provision." Id. at 81.
82 For recent examples of the traditional analysis, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); City of New Orleans v. Duke, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); City
of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976), But see G.
GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 657-65. State interference with interests created by federal law
can more comfortably be analyzed in preemption terms; a state's interference with the law
of another state may be analyzed in terms of the full faith and credit and commerce
clauses. See Monaghan, supra note 5, at 14 n.78, 17.
13 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2569-70 (1976) (cases
cited in dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).
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The Warren Court's most enduring equal protection legacy
was the addition of a "second tier" to the traditional analysis, a tier
where a rigorous justification for challenged state classifications
was demanded.14 Whatever its merits, the second tier's "fundamen-
tal right-fundamental interest" strand did require an analysis of the
interests protected by the clause, and raised some interesting ques-
tions about the relationship between state and federal law.
"Fundamental rights" were, of course, not conceived of as in-
terests having their source in state law. The sole office of the equal
protection clause in this context was to trigger strict scrutiny. But
whatever the ideological appeal in invoking the mesmerizing lan-
guage of equal protection, there was, analytically, no necessity for
doing so. If the right, such as freedom of speech, constituted part
of the "liberty" protected by the due process clause, inadequately
justified discriminatory state law would, as Mr. Justice Harlan
noted, violate due process.85 If the federal right bound the states
prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, as did the
right to travel, any conflicting state law would be displaced by the
supremacy clause without the need for an intermediate reference
to the fourteenth amendment.8 6
The "fundamental interest" strand is more complex. The
Court has now firmly shut the door on efforts to subject state
legislation affecting housing, welfare, education, and so forth, to
the rigors of "strict scrutiny." '87 Our concern here is with the nature
of the rejected interests. Perceptive commentators assert that the
claims made were not viewed as involving independent constitu-
tional "rights," such as freedom of speech or religion, but rather as
implicating fundamental "interests."8 8 To a considerable extent this
framework imposes a retrospective unity on untidy data. The
claims were advanced in different forms. Sometimes they were
asserted to be "rights" having the same status as the textually
specified ones.89 Sometimes they were viewed somewhat less
grandly as adopted stepchildren of acknowledged constitutional
'4 The second tier legacy is still with us. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-67 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2761-63 (1976).
85 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
86 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
87 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), are the decisive precedents.88 See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 659; P. BREST, supra note 69, at 805, 809.
89E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting in state elec-
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rights.9 " And sometimes the claims were made in terms of constitu-
tionally created fundamental "interests. "91 Interestingly, no one
seems to have argued that although the "fundamental" character
of various "interests" is determined by federal standards, those
interests must have been initially created by state law. 92 The Court
has now promised not to invent new nontextually oriented or non-
structurally based rights, 93 and so the Court is not likely to cast
further light on the nature of these "fundamental interests" in the
near future.
94
Many recent equal protection cases have arisen from con-
troversies involving voting in state elections.95 The constitutional
framework seemed to treat the i-ight to vote in state elections as
one created by state law, with various constitutional amendments
prohibiting specified types of discriminations. 96 But despite Mr.
Justice Harlan's protestations,9" the equal protection clause has
been used as a general warrant for invalidating restrictions not
covered by the specific voting amendments. 9 This has generated
several interesting theories which wholly or partially free voting in
state elections from its moorings in state law. Mr. Justice Stewart
asserts that the equal protection clause itself creates "the substan-
9" San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
91 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972).
92 Professor Michelman's "minimum protection for just wants" theory seems to me to
proceed on the premise that these wants are not only to be determined by wholly federal
standards but indeed have their origin in the fourteenth amendment. Michelman, The Su-
preme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
93 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Rodriguez, of
course, follows Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (1976).
91 Fundamental interest analysis is not entirely a matter of historical interest. It ap-
pears again in somewhat modified form in Mr. Justice Marshall's famous "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection analysis, which requires judicial assessment of the importance
of the interest affected by state actions. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Mur-
gia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568-73 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.). See also Coven &
Fersh, Equal Protection, Social Welfare Litigation, and the Burger Court, 51 NOTRE DATME LAw.
873 (1976). At one point or another, a majority of the Court's present members had ap-
parently endorsed this test in one form or another. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at
660-61 & n.9. But recent equal protection clause cases pay it no heed. See, e.g., cases cited
in note 82 supra.
9- For a comprehensive collection of materials, see T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N.
DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1481-1606 (3d ed. 1967).
9 6 See, e.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904). The Court stated: "The privilege
to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amend-
ments."
97 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
9 E.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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tive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified vot-
ers whenever the State has adopted an electoral process"99 of
representation, a theory bred from an interesting mating of federal
and state laws. Several decisions refer to voting as a "fundamen-
tal right," without indicating how such a right can properly be in-
ferred from the text, or from the structure and relationships
created by the Constitution.0 1 In any event, a "fundamental right"
analysis makes reference to the equal protection clause unneces-
sary, as do the occasional suggestions that the right to vote is a
"penumbral" aspect of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. 1"
State law, therefore, plays no significant role in the interpreta-
tion of the equal protection clause: even where interests are
created by state law, their importance for equal protection pur-
poses and the adequacy of the justifications for the state law are
assessed by federal standards. This may have importance in the
future because the equal protection clause, unlike due process,
does not require an initial showing that "life, liberty, or property" is
at stake.
D. The Narrowing of Liberty: "The Gradual Process of... Exclusion"
After three decades, it is once again fashionable to invoke the
language of substantive due process.11 2 And, following Goldberg v.
Kelly, 1 3 there has been an enormous explosion of litigation raising
issues of procedural due process."1 4 It comes as no real surprise,
therefore, that judicial effort to limit the reach of the due process
clause should, in part, find expression in limiting conceptions as to
the nature of the "liberty" the clause protects.
Board of Regents v. Roth"1 5 began that process in earnest. A
nontenured teacher asserted that the lack of procedural safeguards
governing the decision whether to rehire him violated due process.
The Court began its examination of his claim by quoting Meyer's
broad definition of liberty, 1 6 and added grandly that "[iln a Con-
"9San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 n.2 (1973) (concurring
opinion, Stewart, J.). See also id. at 34 n.74 (opinion of the Court).1 But see Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
1
o
1 See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 95, at 848-49. See also Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
102 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
103 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104 For a summary of most of the major Supreme Court cases, see K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW OF THE 1970's 241-76 (1976).
10' 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
106 See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
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stitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning
of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."'"" 7 Broad-but, as previously
noted, not "infinite."'1" 8 The gradual process of exclusion had
begun. Roth rejected the contention that, standing alone, termina-
tion of a specific public employment interfered with either "liberty"
or "property." As to the "liberty" claim, said the Court, no stigma
had been imposed by the decision not to rehire, nor had the Re-
gents "invoke[d] any regulations to bar the respondent from all
other public employment in state universities."' 9 The Court con-
cluded that "[i]t stretches the concept too far to suggest that a per-
son is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job
but remains as free as before to seek another."""a
Roth permits the states to operate a probationary system of
public employment, free from claims that decisions made in the
day-to-day operation of the system constitute deprivations of the
due process rights of individuals affected by those decisions. That
result is certainly defensible. Judgments concerning retention of
probationary employees are often highly personal and subjective,
and the imposition, in the name of due process, of an adversary
procedure into that retention process is a dubious proposition. 1 '
But the road taken by the Court opens to broader and more dif-
ficult vistas. Roth's logic necessarily applies to substantive due pro-
cess even though it is a procedural due process case in form. Since
the probationary employee lacks a "liberty" or "property" interest,
there is no basis under the due process clause for a substantive due
process requirement that a state's conduct meet even the "base line
requirement of rationality." This problem, perhaps, is not acute
when a state is involved, given the existence of the equal protection
clause. But what of probationary employees of the national gov-
ernment? The textual basis for imposition of the rational basis
standard in such a case is not apparent." 2
107 408 U.S. at 572.
1"Id. at 570.
"
9 Id. at 573.
"10 Id, at 575. Roth may profitably be compared with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959), where the Court stated: "The right to hold specific private employment . . . [is]
'liberty' and 'property'...." Id. at 492.
lI" This is an area where, in part, we may prefer to operate without rules and formal
structures. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 490-94
(1965). See also Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. CL 2532, 2540 (1976).
112 To say that there is an independent substantive right (or liberty) to be free from
"arbitrary" governmental action is unconvincing. One could just as readily assert that there
is an independent substantive right (or liberty) to be free from unfair procedures. More
importantly, this argument confuses the scope of review under the due process clause with
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Roth's importance, however, should not be overstated. Roth's
companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, 1 3 emphasized that public em-
ployees are deprived of "liberty" if discharged for reasons that
would violate specific constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of
speech, a position from which the Court has not wavered. 14 More
importantly, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, '" following the Roth cave-
at, held the due process clause to be applicable to a civil service
regulation barring aliens from access to a class of public employ-
ment. Unfortunately, the Court has not adequately explained why
the discharge of a specific public employee does not activate the
due process clause, while "a rule which deprives a discrete class of
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis" does."16 One
is tempted to say that the liberty protected by due process operates
only at wholesale, not retail. 1 7 But even that comfortable generali-
zation would fail as a description so long as the holding of Greene v.
McElroy," 8 that "the right to hold specific private employment...
free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within
the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of [due process]," survives
Roth.1 9 In any event, in the public sector the Court perceives a
material distinction between the right to seek employment and the
right to hold a job forever.121
Liberty, then, although not confined simply to a negative free-
dom from personal restraint, is not synonymous with the freedom
to do everything one wishes, at least where the wish is that the
government continue to provide one with money, property, or
employment. Still, Roth raised no serious question about Butler v.
the initial question of whether the clause is applicable at all. The Court is, however, ap-
parently unconcerned with all of this. See, e.g., Mathews v. De Castro, 97 S. Ct. 431, 432 n. 1
(1976).
113 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
114 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5,
rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
115 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
116 Id. at 102-03. See also Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). In
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court unanimously upheld the exclusion of certain
aliens from supplemental medical insurance under medicare. The Court assumed, with-
out discussion, that an interest sufficient to trigger due process scrutiny was involved.
117 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972), asserts that in such cases
the "injury" is greater. But once the focus shifts from the "importance" of the individual
interest to the "nature" of that interest it is not clear why the extent of the injury matters.
I's 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
119 Id. at 492 (emphasis added). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 120
(1976) (dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
12 See text accompanying notes 9 1-100 supra.
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Peny 's'21 conception of "liberty" as a negative "right to be let
alone," an idea embracing all the interests in personal security (in-
cluding freedom from defamation), which had been protected
from private interference by the common-law courts. Continued
governmental employment, after all, hardly constituted one of
those "fundamental rights long recognized under the common law
system.' 1 22 But other decisions have begun to weaken Butler. In
Kelley v. Johnson,'2 3 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, only assumed arguendo that "liberty" was implicated by a
requirement that a policeman's hair be trimmed as a condition of
his employment. 4 Then Paul v. Davis125 was decided.
E. Paul v. Davis
In Paul the plaintiff complained that a circular sent by local
police officials to stores during the Christmas season defamed him
by describing him as an "active shoplifter." The plaintiff asserted
that this conduct denied him procedural due process because he
had not been given notice and a hearing before the circular was
sent. The court of appeals upheld the claim, relying upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Roth and Wisconsin v. Constantineau126
to support the proposition that state defamation of a private per-
son implicated a constitutional "liberty." In Constantineau the Court
had invalidated on due process grounds a state statute that allowed
a sheriff to label publicly an individual an alcoholic by posting his
name in a public place, without giving him prior notice and a hear-
ing. The Court noted that the challenged procedure denied the
individual more than just the opportunity to purchase alcoholic
beverages within city limits: the posting was an act of defama-
121 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
122 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
123 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
124 Id. at 244. Since the Court was not required to pass on the question, there was no
discussion of whether such a requirement as a condition of employment would at least
implicate fundamental rights long recognized by the common law, at least when the com-
mon law is read with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. If Kelley really does not
involve a protected interest, there will be some anomalies for the layman. Hair-length
regulations in public schools may still be reviewed as an arbitrary restriction on the
student's "property" right to attend school. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Cf.
New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), denying cert. to 480 F.2d 693 (10th
Cir.) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.) (suggesting hair-length regulations violate students'
first amendment right of free speech).
125 424 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
126 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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tion. a27 In language subsequently quoted with approval in Roth, 128
the Court said that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential."'129
But in Paul, the Court characterized this same language as
ambiguous and supportive of the respondent's claim only if "read
that way.' 131 The majority then proceeded to distinguish a long
line of decisions which had recognized the standing of a plaintiff to
complain about governmental defamation. The Court concluded
that in all those cases the defamation standing alone was insuffi-
cient to implicate a liberty interest; instead, all involved an inter-
ference with some specific constitutional guarantee or with some
other "more tangible" interest created by state law. The Court cavalierly
distinguished Constantineau by noting that the state defamation
there involved-posting by the sheriff-had the legal effect of cut-
ting off the plaintiff's prior state-created right to buy liquor, a
factor which, the Court failed to add, played an obviously trivial
role in the decision of that case.13' The Court's re-rationalization
of the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar with those
precedents. In many ways I find this Paul's most disturbing aspect.
Fair treatment by the Court of its own precedents is an indispen-
sable condition of judicial legitimacy.
Taken at face value, Paul would radically reorient thinking
about the nature of the "liberty" protected by .the due process
clause. The case's rationale would confine the federal content of "lib-
erty" to specific constitutional guarantees and to the Roe right of
privacy, and, perhaps, to the Framers' understanding of liberty as
freedom from personal restraint. 32 Otherwise, interests "attain
this constitutional status [as liberty] by virtue of the fact that they
2I Id. at 435-36. It had generally been assumed as the clearest case that a plaintiff had
standing to complain of governmental action if the wrong would have amounted to a tort
if committed by a private person. Indeed, defamation was cited in the leading work as a
prototypical example. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 154 (2d ed. 1973) [herein-
after cited as HART & WECHSLER]. Presumably, that line of authority remains intact, so long
as a constitutionally protected right or an independent "tangible" interest is at stake.
128 408 U.S. at 573. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975).
129 400 U.S. at 437.
130 424 U.S. at 708. But see Codd v. Velger, 45 U.S.L.W. 4175, (U.S. Feb. 27, 1977)
(apparently preserving Roth holding).
"'x Id. at 707. For additional criticism, see Shapiro, supra note 33, at 326; The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 93 n.44 (1976).
132 424 U.S. at 710 n.5 (bill of rights); id. at 712-13 (privacy).
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have been initially recognized and protected by state law,' 3 3 and
it is only state conduct "officially removing the interest from the
recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which
[is] sufficient to invoke [due process] procedural guarantees.' 134
This language suggests that any state conduct imposing a new legal
disability on any prior freedom (including a presumably general
right to be let alone) would implicate "liberty" in the constitutional
sense. For instance, under this new theory, freedom of contract
claims would still implicate due process liberty but under a dif-
ferent rationale. Heretofore, that freedom had been viewed as part
of the "liberty" independently created by the due process clause.
Under Paul, however, a state action interfering with that liberty
could be challenged only if a new state-imposed disability "officially
remov[ed] the interest from the recognition and protection previ-
ously afforded"'' 35 it by state law. But standing alone, defamation
does not qualify as such a "liberty" because the victim of the def-
amation suffers no additional legal disabilities.' 36 The plaintiff in
Paul could vote, drive his vehicle, and buy liquor-all just as before
the defamatory act.13 7
Paul's rule might also exclude claims by victims of physical
assault by state officers, since the victim labors under no new legal
disabilities. There is the possibility that the detention necessary for
the assault will be viewed as an interference with the historical
Blackstonian definition of "liberty" as freedom from personal re-
straint. But even if the detention is held to implicate "liberty," can a
13 3 Id. at 710.
3 4 Id. at 711. Of course, the liberty interest could be created by federal statutory or
decisional law.
13 5 d. In theory the challenge would be available only to those who had the right
before the challenged restriction came into effect. Thus, children born after a restriction
became effective could not claim an interference with their liberty.
136 The Court argued that:
Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present
enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of petitioners' actions.
Rather his interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State may
protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication
of those interests by means of damages actions. And any harm or injury to that
interest . . . [has not] worked any change of respondent's status as theretofore
recognized under the State's laws.
Id. at 711-12. This is not well put by the Court. I think that state libel law is a "guarantee
of present enjoyment of reputation," the unjustified invasion of which results in tort dam-
ages. And I do not see that this is any less true simply because there is no "change of
respondent's status"--at least in the Court's sense that the respondent suffered no new
legal disabilities. The real explanation for the result is in the last sentence of the quotation.
"'See also Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1976); Edelberg v. Illinois
Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279, 285 (7th Cir. 1976).
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court then award damages for the accompanying assault? If so, the
assault damages are parasitic in character, and it is hardly satisfying
to rationalize their award on these terms. Long ago, a noted com-
mentator observed that "[t]he treatment of any element of damage
as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal
evolution. A factor which is to-day recognized as parasitic will, for-
sooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis of
liability.' 138 An alternative theory--that the assault constitutes the
imposition of punishment without trial139 and therefore violates a
specific constitutional right-is open to the objection that such
reasoning rests on a patent fiction. Moreover, such reasoning in-
adequately distinguishes Paul, since defamation could just as easily
be characterized as punishment without trial.
However read, Paul's difficulties are deep ones. Even if the
Court was free to view the question before it as an open one, it
was surely not compelled to reject freedom from defamation as a
protected interest. And, in a "Constitution for a free people," it is
an unsettling conception of "liberty" that protects an individual
against state interference with his access to liquor but not with his
reputation in the community. 14" To the extent that this is an area
for judicial exercise of the "sovereign prerogative of choice,"' 4' the
Court's choice seems to cut sharply against the grain of our
political-constitutional order with its central emphasis on individual
dignity. One does not need the authority of Blackstone for the
proposition that without one's reputation "it is impossible to have
the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right."'142
Moreover, the Court's reasoning ignores the social nature of
human personality. For, as Isaiah Berlin observed in a famous
essay on the meaning of "liberty,". "am I not what I am, to some
degree, in virtue of what others think and feel me to be?"' 43 Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the Court's theory ignores the
spiritual character of human personality. Defamation is a serious
"I T. STREET, 1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
13' Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
140 It may well be that a state could constitutionally abolish all defamation actions in
suits between private parties. It does not follow that a state which has taken such a step
could then itself engage in defamation without implicating fourteenth amendment values.
141 0. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210,
239 (1920).
142 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *134. For the effect of the defamation at issue in
the Paul case on the plaintiff, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 100-01
n.85 (1976), in which Davis is quoted as stating: "Now, five years later... I am broke, with-
out employment, emotionally sick and in a state of anxiety."
13 1. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 155 (1969).
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assault upon an individual's sense of "self-identity," and has from
ancient times been viewed as "psychic mayhem. ' 144 Accordingly,
the Court's conclusion that such an assault implicates no constitu-
tionally protected interest stands wholly at odds with our ethical,
political, and constitutional assumption about the worth of each in-
dividual.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion does more than repudiate the
long-standing trhdition of an expansive reading of the word "lib-
erty" as a matter of federal law. The opinion seems to have com-
pletely reversed the logic of Butler,145 and instead to have pro-
ceeded from the premise that if the challenged conduct would
constitute a common-law tort by a private person, it cannot consti-
tute an interference with the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, the more reprehensible and subject to legal
redress the conduct, the freer the state is to engage in it-at least
until that conduct bumps up against some specific constitutional
guarantee or the hodge-podge right of privacy. Indeed, unless
those latter rights are implicated, the state need not even comply
with the base line requirement of rationality, until, that is, the
state's conduct imposes some new legal disability, however trivial.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist begins his opinion by observing that if
Paul's complaint had been made against a private party there
"would have [been] nothing more than a claim for defamation
under state law."' 46 He then frames the central issue in the case as
whether the due process clause "should ex proprio vigore extend to
him [the plaintiff] a right to be free of injury wherever the State
may be characterized as the tortfeasor.' 1 47 To state the thesis, he
argues, is enough to condemn it, for it "would make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States.' '1 48
The thrust of Justice Rehnquist's concern is unclear. He seems to
assume that the tortious character of the state official's conduct, if
proved, would of necessity establish a constitutional violation. Thus,
he writes: "Respondent's construction would seem almost necessar-
ily to result in every legally cognizable [state-inflicted] injury ...
' Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158 (1955). The meaning of personal
identity is a central concern of much modern philosophical and psychological writing. See,
e.g., Note, The Limits of State Intervention: Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85 YALE
L.J. 826, 834-42 (1976).
145 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
146 424 U.S. at 698.
1471 Id. at 701.
148 Id.
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establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 49 This is
plainly wrong. An invasion of a common-law interest only implicates
a constitutional "liberty." Whether, once implicated, there has been
an impermissible deprivation of that interest is an entirely separate
question. Resolution of that question depends not on the law of
torts, but on such matters as the nature of the invasion, its mag-
nitude, and the character of the justification asserted. Thus, ordi-
narily, negligent conduct by the state would implicate liberty or
property interests but would not, given the fourteenth amend-
ment's concern with protecting the individual from the abuse of
governmental power, constitute a deprivation of these interests.5 "
In any event, whether or not the conduct complained of was illegal
under state law-or under the common law of torts-would not be
dispositive of the merits of the constitutional claim, a point which
Mr. Justice Rehnquist himself expressly notes at the beginning of
his opinion.15 1
Meachum v. Fano152 followed Paul. At issue was a challenge to
the constitutional sufficiency of the procedures surrounding the
transfer of a state prisoner to a more restrictive prison. The chal-
lenge was rejected. The Court observed that the prisoner had not
urged that any specific constitutional right had been violated; that
the generalized "liberty" of due process was no longer implicated
after the lawfulness of the original decision to commit was
established; 53 and finally, that state law created no independent
liberty interest.154
Precisely where these decisions leave us is by no means clear.
Roth, Paul, and Meachum have narrowed the content of "liberty."
Taken together, they seem to have some common core: loss of a
specific job, of a specific prison location, or of reputation does not,
given the countervailing interests at stake, materially impede an indi-
vidual's "freedom to do what he wants." But the victim of defama-
tion finds his options closed in fact, if not in theory; and jobs are
not fungible, except perhaps in economics textbooks. I do not
,19 Id. at 699.
150 Thus the negligent destruction of property, as in Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953), while implicating a constitutional interest, would not ordinarily constitute a
"deprivation" of that interest within the meaning of the due process clause. But see Fox v.
Sullivan, 539 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1976).
,5, 424 U.S. at 699-701. See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60-61 (1967) (legal-
ity of seizure under state law not dispositive of constitutional issues); accord, South Dakota
v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3098 (1976).
152 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
153 Id. at 2538.
154 Id. at 2538-40.
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doubt that the Justices realize all this. Nonetheless, the pressure to
keep these cases out of the federal courts was great, and so a com-
promise was struck. Rather than facing the balancing question at
the merits stage, the Court struck a compromise at the definitional
stage. But it has struck this balance on the uncritical assumption
that every federal interference with state government undermines
the values embodied by federalism. This is hardly self-evident.
A constitutional norm that denies the states power to defame un-
justly their citizens does not seem to undercut any important fed-
eralism value, 155 particularly since federalism as an institutional
arrangement is concerned with the maximization of individual
liberty. 156 There are, indeed, instances when federal intervention
might constitute a "positive instrument of federalism."' 5' In any
event, even if Supreme Court intervention in some way diminishes
federalism, those costs must be weighed against any resulting gains.
A constitutional norm prohibiting state defamation positively rein-
forces the fundamental fourteenth amendment concern for indi-
vidual dignity. Moreover, that amendment was intended to alter
the previous federal-state balance, a point which Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist expressly recognized for a unanimous Court later in the term
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 158
F. The "New Liberty"
The Burger Court's attempt to formulate postulates of self-
denial is understandable, if not acceptable. But why the Court has
embarked on this difficult route of constitutional exegesis remains
unclear. Surely, when read in light of its historical origins and the
demands of "Our Federalism," section 1983 could have been read
less than literally-read so as not to embrace all the interests en-
compassed by the "liberty" (and "property") of the due process
clause. -9 Nor would Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
155 Federalism is one of the major devices by which our ocean-spanning continent
hopes to "reconcile unity with diversity." Abraham, Effectiveness of Governmental Operations,
426 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POLITICAL & SOG. Sci. 81, 94 (1976).
156 For a description of the importance the Founders placed on "liberty," see Diamond,
The Declaration and the Constitution: liberty, democracy & the Founders, 41 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
39 (1975).
157 See Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE LJ. 1007, 1017-24, 1029-33
(1966).
158 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2670-71 (1976). The Court there discussed the increased powers of
Congress over the states, but of course the amendment also augments judicial power.159 See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 277 (1965). Professor Shapo was criticized in McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
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Bureau of NarcoticsM 6  compel the Court to fashion "common law"
damage or equitable remedies against state and municipal offi-
cials. 1 6 1 In the short run, the level of federal interference with
state and municipal conduct would be reduced by closing the doors
of the federal trial courts to plaintiffs asserting certain types of
claims. 162 This, in turn, would give legal scholars time to probe the
ultimate constitutional questions involved. The scholars, of course,
could not "solve" the ultimate problems, but their research and
analysis might help by more clearly focusing debate on the under-
lying problems and their alternative solutions.
This stop-gap solution would not permanently avoid the un-
derlying constitutional questions. Plaintiffs excluded from federal
trial courts would sue in the state courts complaining that the
state's conduct had unconstitutionally deprived them of the due
process guarantee of "liberty" (or "property"). Eventually the
Court would be forced to pass upon the constitutional decisions
made by the state courts. This leads me to express my views on the
ultimate issues.
The real difficulty perceived by the Court is not so much with
the intrusions into the province of the states by the federal trial
courts as institutions, but rather with two related substantive con-
stitutional concerns. The first concern has more relevance in cases
dealing with "property" than with "liberty," but is applicable to
both. This concern grows out of Goldberg v. Kelly's 163 much criti-
cized insistence upon adversary proceedings, absent exigent cir-
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections (pt. 1), 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-10
(1974). I recognize that the present Court shows no disposition to read the post-Civil War
statutes narrowly. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976). Nonetheless, statu-
tory language cast in constitutional terms need not be read to embody the full range of
constitutional interests. E.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 127, at 870-73; Note, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343,
1353-55 (1969).
16o 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Monaghan, supra note 5, at 24 & n.125.
161 See Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976). See also Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities For Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 935-51 (1976). If
§ 1983 preempts judicial remedial power, the difficult question remains as to whether the
congressional denial of the remedy is unconstitutional, and the extent to which the answer
to this question is affected by the fact that state courts provide an alternative forum. These
questions are, of course, beyond the compass of this Article.
162 Jurisdiction could not be grounded on the basis of Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), because § 1983 and other civil rights statutes would, by
implication, be taken to limit the full scope of any otherwise existing nondiversity jurisdic-
tion authority of the federal courts. But see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659-60
(1963) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). See also Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413
(1976).
163 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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cumstances, before governmental actions adversely affecting indi-
vidual interests occur. 1 64 Although the Court has, for all practical
purposes, repudiated the broad scope of the hearings apparently
mandated by Goldberg,'n5 it remains obsessed with the notion of
"some kind" of a prior hearing. "When protected interests are
implicated," said the Roth Court, "the right to some kind of prior
hearing is paramount."' 66 But prior hearings might well be dis-
pensed with in many circumstances in which the state's conduct,
if not adequately justified, would constitute a common-law tort.
This would leave the injured plaintiff in precisely the same posture
as a common-law plaintiff, and this procedural consequence would
be quite harmonious with the substantive view that the fourteenth
amendment encompasses the same liberties as those protected by
the common law.' 6 7 This view, if accepted, would have disposed of
the procedural due process objection in Paul. 68 And it would re-
quire overruling Constantineau, since, in my view, the heart of the
complaint was defamation, not restriction of access to liquor.' 69
Moreover, it may be, as Judge Friendly has observed, that the
whole concept of prior hearing in the area of mass administrative
justice should be reconsidered, at least where there are other "non-
adversary" internal administraitve controls to monitor and check
administrative abuse 7 °1 Due process might mean no process, at
least no formal adversary process. 17'
I do not pursue these inquiries here because they are wide of
my primary concern. I mention them only because I think that
Goldberg's insistence upon prior hearings is at the root of a consid-
164 For a useful general summary of most of the cases and relevant articles, see K.
DAvis, supra note 104, at 242-47, 260-68. See also Monaghan, supra note 5, at 24-26.
'
65 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
166 408 U.S. at 569-70 (footnote omitted). But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333-34 (1976).
'61 Monaghan, supra note 61, at 1366 n.18.
168 424 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 424 U.S. 985 (1976).
169 The common-law courts were most reluctant to grant an injunction when the legal
question was whether the circulation of defamatory material constituted defamation. Thus,
they generally denied injunctive relief against such conduct. By analogy, no prior adminis-
trative hearings would be required.
176 Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). See K. DAVIS,
supra note 104, at 702; Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting,
28 STAN. L. REv. 841, 864-70 (1976).
171 This concept is, in fact, already solidly reflected in our thinking. Some infractions
of liberty or property are too minor to require any process whatever. See Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 587-89 (1975) (dissenting opinion, Powell, J.). See also K. DAVIS, supra note
104, at 266-67; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 58, 102-03 (1976). But see
Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court As School Superintendent, 1975 SuP. Cr. REV. 25,
35-36.
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erable part of the Court's concern. But alteration of our present
conceptions of procedural due process will alleviate only part of
the Court's doubts, for substantive due process is also at stake. In
Paul, for example, the plaintiff could have waived any procedural
objections and argued that the false and defamatory character of
the police circular constituted a denial of substantive due process.
When considered in substantive due process terms, Paul's analysis
discloses its strongest appeal, at least as long as section 1983 is
assumed to incorporate the full range of constitutionally protected
interests. Surely the fourteenth amendment cannot require that
state officials be right in all cases at all times. To continue the
development of section 1983 privilege defenses will not solve this
problem, for they are applicable only to damage claims and not to
requests for injunctive relief.'72 Moreover, unless the privilege is
absolute, some litigation is necessary, and Paul seems animated by
the desire to avoid any litigation of these claims.
But Paul's apparent solution-to make constitutional protec-
tion attach only if the invasion implicates some trivial state-created
interest-does not have much to commend it in terms of the un-
derlying postulates of our political and constitutional order. Paul's
solution involves far too costly a sacrifice of important values. In a
"Constitution for a free people," Paul provides an unacceptable
answer to the question of the constitutional status of a person who is
a victim of intentional, unjustified defamatory statements perpe-
trated by state officials, 173 and, perhaps more generally, to the
question of the constitutional status of the citizens' Blackstonian
right of personal security. 174 Despite the high premium I place on
stare decisis even in constitutional cases, I think thatPaul should be
overruled. The Court could fashion a constitutional law of public
defamation, drawn in part from the complex state of the common-
law rules, as it has done with respect to defamation of public fig-
ures.
If not overruled, Paul should be read as narrowly as possible.
However, I cannot confidently proffer a satisfactorily principled
'
72 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). See
generally Davis, supra note 104, at 573-604. Paul contained a prayer for injunctive relief.
173 Paul, it should be recalled, was decided against the backdrop of state law that pre-
sumably provided some basis for relief against wholly unjustified state-sponsored defama-
tion.
174 The constitutional right of privacy can, of course, protect much of the ground
previously occupied by the law of defamation. Note also the possibility of expanding the
largely group-based rule of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), to cases of indi-
vidual discrimination. See generally Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Note, The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1961).
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limiting conception. Perhaps Paul can be held inapplicable where
the injury to the "right of personal security" is more than imposi-
tion of a stigma. Perhaps wholly unjustified defamation of an indi-
vidual with the purpose and effect of inflicting unjustifiable mental
suffering can still be treated as an invasion of the "liberty" of "per-
sonal security" within the ambit of the due process clause. The
crucial wrong is not so much in reducing a man's reputation
-which is all that the common law protected175-- but in its addi-
tional impact upon his personality. If interference with an in-
dividual's bodily integrity implicates "liberty," I see very little jus-
tification for the conclusion that interference with an individual's
psychic integrity-his personality-is not also protected, at least if
we seriously believe that "[i]n a Constitution for a free people..
the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."'1 76
The word "liberty" could and, given our constitutional tradi-
tions, should be read to embrace intangible interests beyond that of
privacy. More specifically, it should be read to embrace what the
tort law is now in the process of proscribing: namely, any govern-
mental conduct which so invades a decent respect for a person's
personal integrity that, if not fairly justified, the result would out-
rage public sensibility.177 Dean Prosser puts it well: "One who,
by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress . . . is subject to liability .... 8
That the statements are defamatory may constitute evidence of the
invasion, but this is not decisive; indeed, even true statements
gratuitously publicized might invade an individual's right of per-
sonal security. This standard is simply a modern embodiment of
the once widely accepted principle that the Constitution prohibits
all governmental conduct contrary to fundamental principles of
"ordered liberty."'179 Applied in a disciplined manner, this standard
would not give the Court a roving commission to impose noncon-
stitutionally based values on the states.' 80 Nor would it convert the
due process clause into a body of federal tort law.18 ' And mea-
sured against this standard, the plaintiff in Paul arguably did not
175 "The law [of defamation] went wrong from the beginning in making the damage
and not the insult the cause of action." F. POLLOCK, TORTS 181 (15th ed. 1951).
176 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
177 H. KALVEN & C. GREGORY, TORTs 974-75 (2d ed. 1969).
178 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 43 (1956). See also RESTATEENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
179 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
180 Monaghan, supra note 5, at 44-45.
181 Professor Shapo has advanced a similar view of § 1983. See Shapo, supra note 159,
at 320-29.
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state a prima facie case. 182 The wording of the particular police cir-
cular left something to be desired, but a case can be made for the
proposition that it does not violate fundamental traditions of our
law for the police to notify businesses during the Christmas season
that a person is suspected of being an active shoplifter.
II
PROPERTY
A. In General
One need not be a disciple of Charles Beard to recognize the
Framers' enchantment with the "rights of property."'183 But it is
apparent that the Framers hoped to secure those rights less by
constitutional prohibitions than by the creation of a strong national
government with control over commerce.' 84 The new government,
moreover, was to have a representative structure designed to se-
cure a considerable place for the "responsible sort" in the Senate,
the Presidency, and the national courts.1 5 But this scheme proved
insufficient to meet the increasing interference with the "rights of
property" that occurred at the state level as the nineteenth century
passed, and thus the rise of substantive due process doctrines de-
signed to protect those property rights followed.' 86 Interestingly,
during this period social and political theorists increasingly em-
phasized that the protection of economic interests was an aspect of
"liberty,"' 87 rather than "property," a conception ultimately adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court.' 8 8 The right to acquire, own, and use
12 Accordingly, no question of privilege arose. See generally Hochman, "Outrageousness"
and Privilege in the Law of Emotional Distress-A Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 61 (1961).
1'3 For an illuminating discussion of the Beard view, see ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (L. Levy ed. 1965).
184 See the materials excerpted in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMIAR & J. CHOPER, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 177-81 (4th ed. 1975).
185 Greene, Values and Society in Revolutionary America, 426 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLIT-
ICAL & SOC. ScI. 53, 60-61 (1976). For a comprehensive treatment see G. WOOD, THE CRE-
ATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 471-564 (1969).
is' See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
1 7 Coker, American Traditions Concerning Property and Liberty, 30 AmI. POLITICAL SCI.
REV. 1 (1936).
"188 Freedom of contract was, for example, part of the "liberty" protected by due pro-
cess. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Freedom of contract was, however, also
treated as "property." E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898).
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property became an aspect of the broad "liberty" secured by due
process. 89
Given this history, it is hardly surprising that in the past little
attention has been paid to the definition of "property" for due
process purposes. Although there are cases which can be read to
the contrary, time seems to have yielded a consensus that the due
process clause itself does not "create" any property interests 9"
Those interests must be located in some other source, principally
state law. Like the contract clause,' 9 ' therefore, the due process
clause threw a federal constitutional shield around property in-
terests initially created by state law.' 92
The existence, vel non, of "property" seldom raised any issue
reaching the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the few cases raising the question, the Court accepted the
state court's determination as to whether certain interests had been
created by state law, as long as that determination had a "fair and
substantial" basis in state law.' 93 This limited review ensured that
federal constitutional protection for state-created interests was not
undermined by state court manipulation of legal doctrine.
The "fair and substantial basis" rule, it is important to em-
phasize, is entirely consistent with the principle that there is a fed-
eral content to the word "property." To be sure, the interests must be
initially created by state law,' 94 and on that question the state
court's assessment is nearly, although not absolutely, controlling.
But the state court's characterization of those "interests" is another
matter altogether. The difference between the existence of an
interest-a matter of state law-and its significance-a matter of
federal law-is firmly established in other areas of law.' 95 In the
past, this distinction has received little explicit attention in constitu-
tional cases.' 96 It is the implicit premise of the now discredited
189 "As late as the turn of the last century justices were not yet distinguishing between
liberty and property; in the universes beneath their hats liberty was still the opportunity to
acquire property." Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 877 (1932).
190 Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
'9' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
192 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 127, at 500-02. The contrary view of the cases ex-
pressed in Tushnet, supra note 8, at 267-77, rejecting any role for state law seems to me to
be in error both on the basis of principle and authority.
19 Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 127, at 502-04.
194 The "interests" could also be created by some other source, such as federal law, or
that of a foreign state.
195 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 127, at 489-94.
196 For a recent example, see City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 421, 425 n.5 (1976).
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"freedom of contract cases," which clearly assumed a federal con-
tent of the word in holding that a person's interest in gainful em-
ployment constituted "property" (as well as "liberty"). 19 7 But those
cases, it must be admitted, hardly focus on the relevant issues
here. 198 More in point are the cases that marked the demise of the
"right-privilege" distinction. Although some of the interests as-
serted in those cases may not have fitted very comfortably within
the common-law conceptions of property, they nonetheless consti-
tuted part of the system of "entitlements" so important in the twen-
tieth century. And given the purposes behind the protection of
"property," the word may fairly be held to embrace new forms of
property as they emerge. 199 However the "new property" 2110 in-
terests might have been characterized by state law, the Court cor-
rectly proceeded on the implicit premise that they were substantial
enough to qualify as "property" for due process purposes. 20 '
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court address the underlying
issue more directly. The problem first arose in Roth,2 12 where the
Court held that nontenured teachers have a sufficient "property"
interest in their employment to entitle them to some kind of pro-
M See cases cited in note 188 supra.
19' An examination of these cases shows that they proceed on the premise that it is
"obvious" that a property interest is involved. See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 680 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.):
[T]hroughout this litigation everyone has assumed, without discussing the problem,
that the Due Process Clause does apply [and thus property is involved]. Both
reason and authority support that assumption.
Subject to limitations imposed by the common law of nuisance and zoning
restrictions, the owner of real property has the right to develop his land to his
own economic advantage.
Id. at 681 (footnote omitted).
199 Monaghan, supra note 61, at 1380.
200 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Grey, Property and Need:
The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976).
21 See also contract clause cases cited in note 188 supra. In those cases the Court rec-
ognized that, although state law creates contract interests, it can make an independent
judgment on what the state law is. The question is whether the Court is under an obliga-
tion to treat as contract under art. 1, § 10, all agreements that state law treats as contracts.
With respect to "quasi contracts," the answer is clear. Kauper, What is a "Contract" Under the
Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution, 31 MIcH. L. REV. 187, 193-97 (1932). But if the
contract is a valid consensual agreement under state law, the answer is uncertain. The
authorities cited in Merrill, Application of the Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 80
U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1932), seem to support the view that some consensual agreements valid
under state law are not contracts within art. 1, § 10. But some of the contracts therein
discussed were void under federal law, and as to the remainder the Court seemed, in large
part, to be either interpreting state law or applying general contract law theories. The
latter approach does not survive Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
202 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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cedural due process only if state law has created "a legitimate claim
of entitlement. ' '203 This results, said the Court, because property
interests "are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law .... .204 Bell v. Burson's2 115 focus on the "importance" of the
interest, a criterion easily satisfied by terminated public employees,
no longer sufficed.
Roth's analytical foundation is defensible, for the Court appar-
ently proceeded on the premise that although interests are created
by state law, their characterization as "property" for due process
purposes is determined by federal standards. 206 And Roth's com-
panion case, Perry v. Sindermann,2117 emphasized that "property" in
the constitutional sense embraces the broad range of interests se-
cured by "existing rules or understandings. ''218 Moreover, a per-
son's interest in a "benefit" qualifies "if there are such rules or mu-
tually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement
to the benefit.12 9
Claims of entitlement were readily found. In Arnett v.
Kennedy, 21" a federal employee who could be discharged only for
'just cause," challenged the procedural sufficiency of his pre-
termination hearings. A divided Court sustained the procedures,
although no individual opinion commanded the assent of more
than three Justices. Significantly, however, all nine Justices agreed
that the employee had a sufficient property interest to trigger
due process scrutiny. In Goss v. Lopez, 211 a majority of the Court
concluded that a student's right to attend public school was a "le-
gitimate entitlement" sufficient to constitute "property"--thereby
subjecting school suspension procedures to due process scrutiny. 212
203 Id. at 577.
2
04 Id.
205 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
206 The "words 'liberty' and 'property' . . . must be given some meaning." 408 U.S. at
572.
207 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
208 Id. at 601.20 9 Id. This view seems to treat the crucial issue of legitimate entitlements as a question
of law, rather than one of constitutional fact. Thus, I do not believe that the Court is really
concerned with the expectations of the holder of the entitlement. But see The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 58, 98-99 (1976).
210 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
211 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
112 Id. at 574. The dissent apparently did not dispute that technically a "property"
interest was at stake. Id. at 585-86 (dissenting opinion, Powell, J.). See Wilkinson, supra note
171, at 25, 48-50.
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And finally, in Mathews v. Eldridge,213 the Court, in rejecting a pro-
cedural due process challenge to pre-termination procedures for
social security disability payments, said: "[T]he interest of an indi-
vidual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
'property' interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. "214
The foregoing decisions apparently absorbed as constitutional
"property" most of the twentieth century entitlements. The sole
exception was that a state could, under Roth, create a probationary
period in public employment (and perhaps elsewhere) without
thereby creating a "property" (or "liberty") interest. This exception
allowed the states a procedural flexibility unhampered by feder-
ally prescribed notice and hearing requirements. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's three-man plurality opinion in Arnett, however, sug-
gested additional possibilities. In form, his opinion was not di-
rected to the definition of the word "property" but only to the
scope of the procedural protection for what was admittedly a
property interest. It advanced the startling view that an entitlement
derived from a statute is inherently limited by the procedures for
its termination contained in the statute creating the entitlement.215
The thrust of this analysis, however, is to break down any distinc-
tion between substance and procedure and to assert that, in some
contexts at least, procedural safeguards are themselves indispens-
able aspects of the "property" itself. There is probably nothing
inherently illogical in this approach. "Property" may be viewed as
merely a series of discrete rights and powers, the property
teacher's "bundle of sticks." And there is no a priori reason to
exclude "procedural sticks" from the bundle. 1 6 But our legal tradi-
tions strongly oppose this mode of analysis. In countless contexts
we distinguish between substance and procedure, and subject the
procedural aspects of "property" rights to independent constitu-
tional scrutiny. 217 Moreover, the fundamental premises behind the
treating of "entitlements" as property argue against disregarding
213 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
214 Id. at 332. See also Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482, 488 n.2 (1976).
215 416 U.S. at 152-55. Prior to the Civil War, however, there was much support for
the view that due process and legislative process were synonymous forms. Corwin, The
Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REv. 366, 460 (1911). Thus,
properly enacted statutes that limited the scope of a property right would have been prima
facie constitutional under the due process clause. This view, that the clause was only a
restriction on the executive and the courts, has long since gone by the boards.
216 Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 1451-54.
217 Mr. Justice Rehnquist's view still does not command a majority. See, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
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distinctions between substance and procedure. Be that as it may, it
is not far removed from Mr. Justice Rehnquist's mode of thinking
to conclude that an individual can have no "substantive" property
interest under state law, but at best only an interest that certain
prescribed procedures be followed. 218 Bishop v. Wood,219 decided
last term, comes close to so holding.
B. Bishop v. Wood
In Bishop petitioner alleged he was a permanent employee
within the meaning of a local ordinance, and brought a section
1983 action in federal court complaining that he had been dis-
charged without receiving procedural due process. The terms of
the local ordinance provided:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a
period of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what
he must do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee
fails to perform work up to the standard of the classification
held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to per-
form his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any
discharged employee shall be given written notice of his dis-
charge setting forth the effective date and reasons for his dis-
charge if he shall request such a notice. 220
Despite this language the district court concluded, on the basis of
the sparsest state court authority, that under North Carolina law
the petitioner "held this position at the will and pleasure of the
city."'22I The Fourth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided
court,222 and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court by a
narrow five to four majority.
Mr. Justice Stevens framed the decisive constitutional issue in
the following terms: "[T]he sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be
decided by reference to state law. . . .Whether such a guarantee has
been given can be determined only by an examination of the par-
ticular statute or ordinance in question. 223 He admitted that "[o]n
218 But I do not see that there is a federal right to have the procedures followed. See
Ryan v. Aurora Bd. of Educ., 540 F.2d 222, 228-29 (6th Cir. 1976).
219 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
221Id. at 344 n.5 (quoting MARION, N.C., PERSONNEL ORDINANCE, art. II, § 6) (em-
phasis added).
221Id. at 345 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 504 (W.D.N.C. 1973). The
case would seem to have been an obvious one for abstention. See Bellotti v. Baird, 96 S. CL
2857 (1976).
222 Bishop v. Wood, 498 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1974).
222 426 U.S. at 344-45 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
its face the ordinance on which petitioner relies may fairly be read
as conferring such a guarantee," but he relied on the courts below
for the alternative conclusion that the state law created "no right to
continued employment but merely condition[ed] an employee's re-
moval on compliance with certain specified procedures. ' 224 To the
majority, that proved fatal to petitioner's case.
Under Bishop there should in principle be no constitutional
barrier to prevent a state, by clear statement, from denying the
existence of a "right to continued" public employment, attendance
at public schools, or welfare benefits and from then asserting that
the procedures actually afforded by the state with respect to any
discontinuance are all that it need accord. Indeed, lacking any
substantive interest, it seems, for example, that any discontinued
employee or welfare recipient would not possess an independent
constitutional due process right to insist that the state comply with
its own specified procedures. If so, the "right-privilege" distinction
is back in full bloom.
Bishop is wrongly reasoned, or at least wrongly phrased. The
Court erred in thinking that the "sufficiency of the claim of enti-
tlement must be decided by reference to state law." The nature and
character of the entitlement is surely "decided by reference to state
law," but not its "sufficiency" to constitute a "legitimate" entitle-
ment and therefore "property" in the constitutional sense. An il-
lustration clarifies this. Suppose that a state motor vehicle statute
invested automobiles with all the attributes of property as that term
is generally understood, but also provided that no person who
bought a car after the statute was passed would be deemed to have
a "right to continued" ownership as against the state. If the state
were suddenly to confiscate automobiles for revenue purposes,
surely the Supreme Court, upon assessing the state law, would con-
clude that the owner's interest had sufficient attributes of "prop-
erty" at least to implicate the due process clause.
225
The entitlement cases are no different. A state-funded wel-
fare or pension system can qualify as "property," as Mathews v. El-
dridge226 reaffirms. That an entitlement can constitute "property" is
not altered, as Bishop seems to assume, simply because the state law
224 Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
225E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See also the
line of cases commencing with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), holding that the
right to a hearing before repossession of a chattel does not turn upon who has title under
state law.
226 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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also provides that there is "no right to continued receipt." There
are few, if any, "continued" rights to receive entitlements. Welfare
programs and public jobs can be abolished, after all. But while they
are in general existence, they can constitute "property" for the indi-
vidual. Flemming v. Nestor,227 a case involving the validity of a
termination of social security benefits, proves particularly instruc-
tive in this regard. The Court there declined to hold that indi-
vidual interests in these programs constituted "accrued property
rights," because to do so would deprive the Social Security System
"of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing
conditions which it demands. '2 28 But the absence of a right to
continued receipt of the benefits did not mean that the interest was
not within the ambit of the due process clause: "The interest of a
covered employee . . . is of sufficient substance to fall within the
protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the
Due Process Clause.1
229
The absence of a "continuing right" is not, therefore, entitled
to the weight attached to it by the Court. Still, the case of public
employment is perhaps the hardest analytically, since even now we
are not accustomed to viewing continuance in specific public em-
ployment as an entitlement of the same order as welfare payments.
It would, indeed, have been possible to say that such an interest in
specific public employment could never constitute "property" in
the constitutional sense, but Roth, Perry, and Arnett foreclose any
such categorical position. Roth formulated a different mode of
analysis by analogizing interests in public employment to other
forms of entitlements. Like its counterparts in the "liberty" area,
Roth does reflect some balancing, with the Court making a norma-
tive judgment based upon the reasonable expectations of the public
employee and the state's need for flexibility in areas where judg-
ments are often intuitive. But the mode of analysis is the applica-
tion of independent federal standards to state-created interests.
Bishop poses a unique problem-a state law which on the sur-
face has an essentially contradictory character. The first two sen-
tences of the Bishop ordinance look remarkably like the 'Just cause"
statute in Arnett.23 ° So viewed, Bishop raises several important is-
sues. The conversion of a 'Just cause" provision into its opposite as
a matter of state law raises substantial issues under the traditional
227 363 U.S. 603 (1966).
2 28 Id. at 610.
229 Id. at 611.
230 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970), quoted in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 140 (1974).
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"fair and substantial support" test, at least where the employee
gains his nonprobationary status before the "conversion." In this
aspect, therefore, Bishop raises the question of the Supreme Court's
scope to independently determine the content of state law in order
to enforce federal constitutional guarantees. 23 1 But such an inquiry
need not be undertaken. It is enough to focus on the significance of
the state law as it stood at the time Bishop was decided. The state
had, in effect, denied "tenure" protection to a class of persons not
normally viewed as "probationary." Bishop mistakenly assumed that
the statutory language providing that there was "no continued
right to its receipt" was decisive. But that should be only one factor
in a principled analysis. Unless a state court had held that the
ordinance's term "permanent" meant "probationary," the Supreme
Court could have properly reasoned that the interest in Bishop was
of sufficient magnitude to constitute "property." Such an employee
was, after all, different from the employee in Roth who was hired
for a fixed period; he had reached a step in state employment that
for some purposes presumably differentiated him from the purely
probationary employee. That additional stature seems to me to be
enough to constitute "property."
C. The Implications of Bishop v. Wood
If Bishop is to be followed, it seems to stand for the following
proposition: a statute or ordinance which, facially or as construed,
requires only that an employee receive a "statement of reasons"
does not, as a matter of federal constitutional law, give him an
interest significantly distinguishable from Roth to constitute "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the due process clause. The only point
at which such an interest reaches the "property" level for constitu-
tional purposes occurs when the state law restricts termination to
grounds of "individualized cause," as in Arnett.232 Even if read this
231 The Court has thus far concluded that, unlike the "independent judgment" rule of
the contract clause cases, its authority is restricted to the "fair and substantial basis" rule,
unless perhaps a contract claim is made under the due process clause or contract clause.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra not 127, at 501-05. In practice the tests come close to con-
verging, because in contract clause cases great deference is paid to the view of the state
court. Id. at 501-02.
232 See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488
n.2 (1976). Thurston v. Delke, 531 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1976); Huntley v. Community
Sch. Bd., 543 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1976).
I am most reluctant to conclude that the existence of state-provided procedural
safeguards is enough to show that a "property" interest has been created. Where the gov-
ernment is not under a constitutional obligation to provide procedural protections because
of the absence of a "property" interest, the provision of sensible safeguards ought not to
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narrowly, however, the case could have far-reaching consequences.
It might be argued that under Bishop the state would be restrained
by generalized procedural due process only with respect to existing
relationships interruptible only for cause. 233 A state eager to max-
imize its freedom from due process scrutiny in the public sector
(for example, with respect to public welfare or public employment),
arguably need only restructure any program along temporal lines.
At the expiration of a specific period the "property" interest would
end, and accordingly, a state decision not to continue the benefit-
or more accurately, not to recommence it-would seemingly not
involve any "property" interest.
I doubt, however, that such a danger will materialize. The
Court's doctrine is still flexible enough to permit a holding that a
present legal relationship, interruptible only for cause, plus a prac-
tical expectancy of its continuance, might constitute "property."
Bishop, after all, involved a relationship which, at all times, was one
that existed only at will. But if the state legislature is willing to go
further and to restructure its programs so that they are entirely "at
will" under state law, Bishop's logic cannot be escaped. No "prop-
erty" interest has been created, and thus no due process is required
unless some "liberty" interest is also threatened. I hope that the
political process can act partially to restrain the state legislatures
from redesigning their programs in "at will" terms,2 34 and I believe
that the state courts are not likely to seize upon ambiguous state
law to reach such a result with respect to interests that sensible men
value. Moreover, the "liberty" protected by the due process clause
will, as we have seen, often be involved even if "property" is not.
CONCLUSION
The Court's present "gradual process of exclusion" probably
has not resulted in much narrowing of the "liberty" and "property"
protected by due process. Indeed, it may only result in the creation
of a technical barrier, infrequently and erratically invoked to ex-
clude cases from the Court's docket, so that the rules will in time
be perceived as arbitrary. 235 But the cases are capable of broader
result in the penalty (in the state's view) of triggering the applicability of the due process
clause. Plainly, any such theory might be counter-productive, for the state's only option in
that case would be to provide no procedural safeguards whatsoever.
233 See, e.g., note 124 supra.
234 E.g., Moody v. Daggett, 97 S. Ct. 274, 282 n.8 (1976) (noting that Congress has
provided statutory right to parole revocation hearing).
"' Codd v. Velger, 45 U.S.L.W. 4175 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1977), apparently assumes that
a probationary public employee has a right to a name-clearing administrative hearing
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mischief,236 particularly Bishop v. Wood. They are capable of gen-
erating doctrine and results that are inconsistent with the long-
standing conceptions about the meaning of "liberty" and "prop-
erty" in a "Constitution for a free people." Accordingly, I hope
that the Court will not proceed much further in the direction sug-
gested by Paul and Bishop.
where defamation is alleged. Among the difficulties with the holding is that the Court does
not explain how the Roth nationale survives Paul. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
Since a probationary employee has no "liberty" interest in specific public employment, it is
not clear how he differs from an ordinary citizen when he complains of defamation.
216 See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 1458-64.
